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ABSTRACT
A comparison was conducted of Central Business District
(C.B.D.) office Space performance to Suburban office space
performance from a mean sample of seven cities, and for the
Boston urban area in particular. C.B.D. studies covered the
period 1970 to 1986, and suburban studies covered the period
1975 to 1986. The study included a survey of pertinent
literature, and tests upon Net Operating Income, major Boston
area office population indicators (absorption, vacancy, and
occupied area), holding period returns and a valuation model.
Results of the tests indicated that C.B.D. office space
returns were equal to or greater than suburban returns while
exhibiting lower risk, both across the seven city sample and
in the Boston area. Returns on Boston C.B.D. office space
were found to be greater than the seven city mean returns,
but substantially riskier. Finally, all trends accelerated
greatly in the last four years of the study period.
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Section One: Introduction (1.1 to 1.7)
1.1 The office space industry in the United States
reflects both the business practices and condition of the
underlying economy. The type, design, location, function,
and tenants of office buildings have influenced American
commerce and industry. Levels of office construction,
vacancy and absorption annually comprise a large portion of
the Gross National Product, and are among the first
indicators of economic recession or expansion.
1.2 The office space market is divisible into two
broad categories based upon location: 1) the Central
Business District (C.B.D.), and 2) the Suburbs. Both
populations have distinct characteristics, and can respond
to local and national economic influences differently. In
general, urban office buildings tend to be larger and
command higher rents than the suburbs, while catering to
the service sector industries. Suburban office buildings
usually have superior access to transportation arteries,
and better parking facilities than in the C.B.D., and
employ a non-urban population.
1.3 The national C.B.D. and suburban office markets
are further divisible into broad geographic zones, and then
into urban subdivisions. Boston Massachusetts, located in
the Northeastern office market zone provides an excellent
microcosm for the study of office space trends and cycles.
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The area has been inhabited continuously since 1630, always
figured prominently in the national economy, and currently
has one of the strongest C.B.D. and suburban business
environments in the country.
1.4 The national office space market has experience
three cycles of recession since 1970. The peak years of
these economic downturns occurred in 1973, 1978, and 1982,
and all were followed by rebounds. In each case, a period
of over-building and speculation had created an excess
supply of office space. The subsequent establishment of a
new economic equilibrium lowered building rents, which
eventually revitalized demand. As demand returned,
construction resumed, and the cycle was completed. The
Boston C.B.D. and suburban office market participated in
the national trends listed above, often performing
differently than the national average.
1.5 The cyclicality of the office space market and its
associated industries has created problems and
opportunities that effect many different parties.
Developers, investors, owners, and users of office space
are continually faced with vital financial decisions, the
consequences of which are susceptible to economic cycles.
Among the most frequent choices to be made, is that of
C.B.D. versus suburban building location for investment
purposes. This determination process is particularly
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comprehensive. The positions of all pertinent parties,
economic feasibility, logistical and construction factors
are but a few of the considerations involved. When all of
the applicable data can be viewed from a risk versus return
framework, the investor(s) can decided where to build. This
framework is primarily the analysis of local and national
office space cycles, and other related trends.
1.6 This thesis examines the choice of office space
location in the C.B.D. versus suburbs. Its purpose was to
determine which location, if either, held its value better
from the perspective of the investor. The analysis utilized
both national and Boston data, and compared C.B.D. and
suburban office space performance among and between these
two sources. This information was tested by four analytical
procedures: 1) a comparison of Net Operating Incomes, 2)
specific measurements of Boston C.B.D. and suburban office
building populations, 3) a determination of Holding Period
Returns, and 4) a valuation model. When conclusive, the
results of these procedures either illustrated pertinent
trends in the office market, or were quantified for their
comparative values.
1.7 The thesis is divided into six sections. The first
section provides introductory material. The second section
includes a history of the office space market in general
and in Boston, and a survey of literature relevant to both
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national and Boston office space. The third section
contains a discussion of the major themes found in the
office literature. This section also includes a model of
urban versus suburban office space value. The fourth
section reviews the methodology and results derived from
the data sources employed. The fifth section presents the
conclusions, including a determination of the relative
value of C.B.D. and suburban office space in the Boston
area.
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Section Two: History (2.1 to 2.16) and Literature (2.17 to
2.54)
2.1 Modern office space is an intrinsically American
phenomenon of Chicago origin. In 1885 William Lee Baron
Jenny's 10 Story Home Insurance Building ushered in the era
of skeletal iron frame works and steel beams. The "Chicago
School" of architecture, as it became known, was the first
modern response of the office space industry to prevailing
economic influences. Industrialization had catalyzed urban
development throughout the country, and caused the first
large scale appearance of business service industries. In
Chicago this trend was accelerated by the Great Fire of
1871, which effectively cleared 2000 acres in the city, at
the cost of 18,000 buildings and $196,000,000 in damage.
Within the next 9 years Chicago would invest over
$316,000,000 rebuilding itself, and in doing redefine the
concept of office space. Inevitably, of these events the
"Skyscraper" was born.
2.2 Other factors heralded the Skyscraper. American
society's agricultural focus was in decline, causing a
demographic shift to the cities. Ultimately this migration
increased the labor pool available for office jobs.
Quantum improvements in transportation communications
urbanized the large corporations (indeed modern office
space and modern corporations were born around the same
time). Suddenly C.B.D. land values soared, and
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architectural design stressed height. There were other
pertinent breakthroughs. During the 1880's both the
electric elevator and poured foundations were perfected and
became widely available. Soon the practice of large scale
commercial leasing began, creating another new associated
industry.
2.3 By the 1920's the Skyscraper had become the very
symbol of American business success. Most successful
corporations and major cites rushed to build buildings that
reflected their power and wealth. These early developers
soon experienced the first wide scale demonstration of
office space supply versus demand: the over-building of the
late Twenties. The excess of space was absorbed slowly,
values fell as the first office space recession began. The
1929 stock market crash and the Great Depression that
followed prolonged the office space market's woes. Mounting
business failures led to further increases in vacancies.
American businesses, which had occupied 145 Million sq ft
of office space in 1931, dropped to 130.4 Million sq ft in
1933. Rental rates plummeted in an attempt to find
equilibrium.
2.4 By 1935 the office space market began to
strengthen. The general economy had already began to
recover two years before, but office space displayed a
delayed reaction to this macro trend. Further
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technological advances increased the practicality and
desirability of tall buildings. Florescent lighting now
illuminated all sections of the office floor plate, making
interior core locations equally functional to workers. Air
conditioning and sound proofing improved the workplace
atmosphere and led to a hike in productivity. The farms
experienced further depopulation, as mechanized techniques
lowered human labor requirements.
2.5 World War II provided a huge stimulus for the
office space market, raising demand to unprecedented
heights. When Pearl Harbor was attacked, the Federal
government occupied 3.9 Million sq ft, by the time of
Hiroshima and Nagasaki, this had increased to 21.15 Million
sq ft.
2.6 After the war a pattern of supply and demand
cycles imposed itself upon the maturing office space
industry. In 1948 the first post war slump hit the market
causing an eventual construction slow down. Yet
significant vacancies did not reappear until the late
1950's, after a surge of construction in the new
"International Style" of Architecture. During the 1960's
office construction again accelerated, as did the expansion
of America's highway system. Concurrently, office space
development began to leave the cities and head out into the
suburbs, where so many American's now preferred to live,
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shop and now work. Greatly improved highway systems and
airports made the suburban sites even more attractive and
practical.
2.7 The 1970's began with another phase of severe over
supply, tumbling rents and construction halts, but by mid
decade this process started to correct itself. By 1979
office development had rebound, which predictably led to
another space glut in the early 1980's as the newest set of
technological improvements had impacted the supply-demand
equilibrium. Since 1970 the average size of the new
buildings coming on line exceeded 500,000 sq ft, twice that
of their pre-1970's counterparts. As oil prices soared
after-1973, energy consciousness changed building designs
and values. Architects now sought to reduce outside
surface area of buildings, and in a few examples actually
started to build down instead of up. Advances in computer
technology and data processing exerted an influence, as
"smart buildings" (predesigned to accommodate large
computers and telecommunications needs) became popular. The
movement away from the cities continued, as larger
corporations now chose to relocated their headquarters in
the suburbs.
2.8 The 1980's have been a period of uneven prosperity
for the American office space industry. As a whole, the
nation experienced a small recession around 1982. Some
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parts of the country have since experienced an
unprecedented boom, while for others a devastating bust.
The cities of the East and West coasts have been
particularly favored by recent times. Foreign and pension
fund investments, recent Federal tax reforms, strong
F.I.R.E. & Service (Financial, Insurance and Real Estate)
economies, and stringent local regulations have created a
tremendous growth in central business district (C.B.D.)
values. As a result, the skylines of Boston, New York,
Philadelphia, Washington, Los Angeles, San Francisco and
many others have changed substantially each year. The
cities of the nation's industrial interior (with some
exceptions), and oil cities especially, have been the
victims of severe economic downturns. Property values,
rents and vacancies in Houston, Dallas and Denver are at
all time negative extremes. In Houston, the epitome of Real
estate disaster, net absorption was until recently
negative.
2.9 Thus the office markets of the eighties have
reflected to a greater extent than ever before the changing
nature of the base economy that supports them. This
relationship will intensify as the basic of the American
economy redefine themselves over the next decade. Office
space will measure the magnitude of change, as heavy and
labor intensive industries continue to leave for other
countries, and high tech, F.I.R.E. and professional
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services grow.
2.10 Due to its commercial orientation, Boston has
always had some type of office space market. For the
purposes of this thesis, the modern stock of office space
began towards the end of the Nineteenth century (as it
earlier in Napoleonic France). By 1890, after another
convenient downtown fire helped clear the way (IE Nov. 9,
1872) the city acquired its first modern office buildings
in its financial district. Yet full scale development of
Boston's office space was to lag far behind Chicago, New
York and other cities. Boston was still primarily a port,
struggling with immigrant housing problems, as well as
being the nucleus of the region's manufacturing based
economy. The city's future role of F.I.R.E. and service
sector industries mecca was many years off.
2.11 For decades, the 1915 Custom House tower
dominated the Boston Skyline. Large scale construction
began in 1940's, when the city's insurance companies and
banks began to assert a national presence. By the mid-
1950's, as part of the nationwide construction boom, Boston
experienced dramatic office space construction. The first
John Hancock Tower appeared in the Back Bay during the
1950's giving the insurance district a new look. In 1965
this same district put up Boston's first giant office
tower, the million sq ft plus Prudential Tower.
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Simultaneously, in the financial district, State Street
Bank erected a structure of similar magnitude. Several
other large complexes followed, including the conversion of
the seady Scollay Square into Government Center, until the
market slowed as part of a national trend in the late
1960's.
2.12 It was during this period that the Boston
suburban ring developed its first appreciable amounts of
office space. A proliferation of high tech companies and
related industries throughout the Route 128 region created
a large demand. Financial and insurance corporations
reinforced the trend by moving back room clerical offices
out to the suburbs. Suburban communities encouraged such
development to secure tax revenues with minimal
infrastructure impact.
2.13 During the mid-seventies Boston revived (again
mirroring the national cycle) with most of the major
downtown banks following State Street's lead. The First
National Bank of Boston, Shawmut Bank, and the Bank of New
England all put up large towers that quickly increased
Boston's available office Space. The trend continued
throughout most of the seventies, with only a small
slow-down during the national recession of 1982. Since that
time the construction of office space (especially Class A
luxury) in Boston has proceed at an unprecedented pace, and
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made Boston a national leader in that category.
2.14 Since 1984 Boston has added over 50,000 new jobs,
and unemployment has dropped to 3.5% by the end of 1986 (it
has since then fallen even further). Real estate
development to accommodate such growth has exceeded $3.5
Billion dollars, and fostered a growth of office space from
37.2 million sq ft in 1980 to over 46 million sq ft today.
As a related indicator, Boston Hotel space has also
undergone a tremendous increase. Yet Boston has begun to
diverge from some national trends by continuing its
development boom while other strong areas of the country
have begun to slow down. Despite the volume and rate of
production, Boston's space absorption is still very high
and vacancies (at 6%) are below the national average. Over
the last five years downtown Boston demand has averaged 1.6
million sq ft per year.
2.15 This healthy market has attracted a great deal of
investor capital because of the high appreciation rates it
has offered. In many cases, newly constructed office space
in Boston is selling at prices far above the actual
development cost. Despite the negative effects that the tax
reform act of 1986 has had upon many forms of real estate,
Boston office space was not adversely affected by it.
(This is because most if not all of Boston's major office
buildings are income deals and not tax shelters.) This is
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particularly true for Boston's proliferation of luxury
class buildings, which typifies most of the larger projects
in the city. Boston's working population has also greatly
expanded in the office worker segment, and is predicted to
expand further as demonstrated below:
Employment in Boston's Principal Service
Industries (1985 and 2000)
Year | 1985 | 2000
Business Services | 47,200 | 87,800 |
Professional Services | 36,300 : 63,500 ;
Finance | 85,100 : 108,000 |
Health | 65,900 : 88,300 |
Higher Education | 27,700 | 31,900 |
--- -----------------------------------------Total |262,200 |379,500|
Source: Boston Redevelopment Authority
2.16 Indeed, the prognosis for Boston's next decade is
very good. All major office space areas are predicted to
increase their square footage dramatically. Some of this
growth represents buildings planned in the eighties that
will come on line in the nineties, but the bulk of it will
meet the needs of Boston's expanding economy. According to
reports of the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, of the
nation's 330 major metropolitan areas, Boston shall move
from 7th place to 6th in personal income, from 15th to 11th
place in per capita income, from 6th to 5th in total
population, and 5th to 4th in total employment [2]. Office
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employers will provide 2 out of every 3 jobs in the Boston
area, and total employment gain in the metropolitan region
shall exceed 775,000 jobs [2].
2.17 The office space market has long been the subject
of academic research and study. Practioners and
academicians alike have consistently sought a cyclical
formula that can explain the various swings routinely
experienced by this industry. In pursuit of this goal,
certain characteristics of the office space market receive
recurring attention; a) the nature of the cycles
themselves, of which timing is a sub-subject, b) the
effects of over-building, c) the nature of construction, d)
interest rates and inflation, e) vacancy rates and
absorption, f) demography and location, and g) the current
status of the market and forecasts.
2.18 Cycles in the real estate industry are referred
to with such frequency that their existence appears to be
factual, but conclusive evidence to this effect is lacking.
Cycles remain simultaneously as difficult to prove as they
are to deny. While an all encompassing theory of the
office market is not practical, there are key elements,
that if these cycles exist, would serve as leading
indicators. The testing of historical data for
statistically significant relationships is the most
compelling research methodology. Yet real estate's ever
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changing nature frequently defies classification, and
challenges previous theory. As a general rule, M.I.T.
econometrician William Wheaton has stated that office space
cycles are triggered roughly once every 10 years [10].
2.19 The office market has been characterized by two
dominant themes since 1945. First, is overall growth in the
office sector due to continually increasing levels of
office sector employment. (Yet the labor force should grow
smaller in the future as baby-boomer pass into middle and
old age.) Secondly, in the short run, the chronology of the
market can be broken down into a series of shorter, 8-10
year cycles. Both themes exist simultaneously, and
influence all sectors of the office space market.
2.20 Office space data is chiefly supplied by two
sources: first, new construction permits and the Commerce
Department's series on current value of office permits, and
secondly, additions to the stock of office space. Other
reliable sources are general construction trends, levels of
completion, levels of office employment (IE 75% of occupied
office space in all urban areas is occupied by F.I.R.E. and
service sector enterprises), absorption rates, and vacancy
rates. In general this data is constrained by
incompleteness, and time lags, the effects of which must be
calculated into the relevance of any study.
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2.21 The above factors and sources have been intensely
scrutinized for the 1967-1986 period, and much of the
current cycle theory is derived from this work. The
prevailing cycle theory is as follows: The high office
employment growth during 1966-69 created a tight market by
1969 and a flurry of office space construction. Profit
speculation led to over-building, which contributed to the
national economic recession of 1969-71, and boosted vacancy
rates. Construction slowed but did not cease, which
illustrates lag effect so central to this industry.
Building finally did stop by 1975, at which time the nation
was in the midst of a major national recession. The
economy recovered and experienced a boom by 1979-80, but
construction did not pick until almost two years later,
this time illustrating the other side of the lag effect. In
1982 yet another recession hit the industry, but it was
short lived and its effects minimal. Construction did slow
down, but it remained strong by historical comparison.
2.22 This see-saw effect underscores the sensitivity
of both sides of the office market to macro as well as
micro economic factors. Demand is primarily influenced by
levels of employment, and the cyclical nature of the
employment growth rate. Supply is chiefly effected by
growth of office employment. Supply can actually curtail
the magnitude of a given cycle. As the economy heads into
a recession, absorption falls and vacancies rise. This
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takes several months (or years) to occur, and even more
time for these effects to translate into lower rents and
asset values. During this period observant developers have
time to ascertain the trends, and can freeze existing
projects and cancel others. If enough projects are halted
the market can start to head back towards equilibrium. In
this fashion a boom or recession in the national economy
can be regulated by an efficient play off of construction
and absorption.
2.23 Timing is central to the nature of cycles. As
stated above, the market does not clear itself during the
short run, it experiences a lag effect. It must remain
"soft" or "tight" for several years before vacancies,
absorption and rents respond to it. When rents do change,
supply seems to be more elastic than demand. This causes a
brief market instability as developers and owners quickly
try to impose a equilibrium on the market which causes
market instability.
2.24 Timing problems are intrinsic to the inefficient
nature of stable office space markets. The lengthy process
of "Landlord-tenant matching", and long term rental leases
keep the market from peak efficiency. Because of the
imperfect state of both parties' information, negotiations
can drag on for months, entailing compromises from both
parties. While these compromises are for the good of the
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lessor and lessee, they often fail to maximize the full
economic potential of the building from either parties'
point of view. Theoretically, this phenomenon represents
an economic loss because the building does not generate the
most income possible. Long term leases amplify this
effect.
2.25 Wheaton [10] describes the office market as
different from many others in its tenure structure. Eighty-
five percent of the market is rented not owned, and the
leases usually span 10-15 years. During any given year
only about 10% of those leases roll over, at which time the
bulk of those tenants usually move. Therefore, the
property is consistently locked into long term deals where
rent sooner or later does not match prevailing market
rates. This creates an artificial burden or windfall for
one of the two parties, and adds to market inefficiency.
Long term leases are beginning to correct these flaws.
Operating cost pass through clauses and escalation indexes
attempt to realign the property to the market, but are
subject to time lags before they take effect. Generally,
the longer the term of the rental contract, the more
unresponsive the building is to shifts in the economy.
2.26 In a more abstract sense, timing defines the
expectations by which so much of the office space industry
functions. Developers build buildings and owners lease
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them out, all on projected returns over time. The value
created by a developer and represented by a rental income
stream are capitalized to determine the deal's value.
2.27 Finally, the corporate life stage of a tenant
presents a critical office market timing issue. A growing
firm will at first try to house its expansion internally.
Then the company will attempt to obtain noncontiguous
space, and finally, at the end of the lease, the company
will regroup at another location. Conversely, declining
firms will at first try to hold on to excess space as they
vacate it. Eventually they will move out to smaller, more
cost effective, locations. In a given market or
nationally, the trends of corporate growth or decline
directly influence the office market.
2.28 Over-building is often cited as the most
observable manifestation in office space development
cycles. There are several different scenarios that explain
an over-abundance of office space, and the depression of
values that follows. Myopic profit anticipation is the
most widely accepted model. In this situation developers
project their eventual profits based upon the
characteristics of a currently strong market. Then, during
the time lag between proforma and product, the market
becomes soft and the developments are subject to reduced
demand. The market quickly becomes over saturated, as
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buildings in the pipe line can not be stopped. Absorptions
and rents fall accordingly, while vacancies rise forming a
new equilibrium. This process of readjustment can then
take years, and defines a peak or trough in the office
market cycle of values.
2.29 Academicians have proposed that the office space
industry could be regulated, and extremes in the cycle
avoided, through a careful management of supply [10]. If
the production of office space were monitored so as not to
outpace demand, consistent long term profits would be
assured. This theory is impractical for many reasons;
attractive short term profits, the independent nature of
developers, poor communication, and largely imperfect
knowledge about the market do not encourage such
coordination. Furthermore, in planned state economies,
were such regulation is supposedly practiced, office space
construction is still subject to cyclical swings.
2.30 Cyclical office space models must account for a
construction period "lag factor". In the years in which it
might take a building to proceed from concept to
completion, the nation or a particular city might
experience several swings in the economy. Furthermore,
construction is a function of the local economy in which it
is occurring. Labor, logistics and climatic considerations
might all influence the progress of a building, that might
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in turn contribute to a still larger trend.
2.31 Because office space construction cycles are a
process of current conditions used to project future
profits, unanticipated variations in demand are ignored at
the outset. Given the frequency of macro economic changes,
and their direct impact upon construction and valuation of
office space, the industry is inherently inefficient.
Absorption is influenced by the reaction of office
employment demand to the overall amount of occupied space.
On a per employee basis, this relationship is higher in
product abundant markets as the price of space declines.
Absorption is constrained in tight markets by an inadequate
supply of space. The demand for space per employee is
effected by the general economic outlook and by particular
recessions. Office space cycles are also influenced by
trends in demand or consumer preferences. Some components
of this demand include non-contiguous back office space,
historic structures, and prestige highrises is very high.
The construction industry in and of itself represents a
large part of the economy (11% of G.N.P. [5]) and is
cyclically unstable. Downturns in the construction
industry have durable effect, because of the reassemble
time of construction crews and materials that are required.
Employment statistics show that the industry retains its
labor pool throughout bad times, but that it redistributes
itself to follow available work. Seventy-five percent of
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all persons reporting earnings in contract construction
derived most of their earnings from construction jobs. Even
more had their longest full time employment within that
industry [5]. Yet reassembling the necessary labor to build
a project can represent tremendous expense.
2.32 Construction cycles are the reflection of office
space cycles, and there is a wealth of empirical evidence
to document them. Over the 1950 to 1978 period there were 5
iterations of the construction cycle on a national level, 6
in the private construction sector, 4 in the private non-
residential sector (offices), and 3 for the public sector.
There were seven and four respectively in federal and state
construction sectors [5]. Construction is a highly volatile
segment of the economy, and it can fluctuate without
parallel in other industries. According to trend adjusted
data, cyclical swings have become increasingly severe since
the late 1960's. The sharply differing fiscal policies of
the Eisenhower and Kennedy/Johnson administrations
initiated this trend [5], and it has yet to abate. This
phenomenon is particularly true of private sector
construction, which is becoming increasingly more erratic
and difficult to analyze by trend. Construction as a whole
displays greater volatility than any of its subsectors,
with extremes in any one segment rarely offset in another.
Cyclical changes in private and public sectors are
similarly unrelated. Fluctuations in construction often
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exceed those of the G.N.P.
2.32 The construction of new office space has
experienced several cyclical peaks since World War II. The
late fifties, early seventies, and the mid eighties have
all been periods of intense growth in the field (see Fig. 1
on next page). The first two peaks amplified their effect
by combining with national economic recessions. The result
of this amalgam were historical highs in the vacancy rate
in both 1967 and 1976, and inevitably, construction shut
downs. (This pattern so defined the that last two
construction cycles.) Yet the current construction boom
has not conformed to the trends established earlier.
Vacancies rates have risen (as high as 16% in 1985), but
construction in many cities is still strong and growing.
This prolonged "good health" is due, at least in part, to
the favorable tax treatment and changing investor attitudes
and objectives that have characterized this decade
(Especially the tax acts of 1981 and 1986). Finally, the
boom's persistence has been fueled by the infusion of
massive debt and equity in the 1980's.
2.33 Interest rates are among the most important tools
by which developers project profit. When the nominal rate
declines developers usually opt to build. This decision is
based upon the assumption that operating costs will decline
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Fig 1: Office Space Construction Cycles
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(or hold steady), and that the pool of funds available to
tenant for investment will increase. This theory is a
component of the more generalized belief that interest rate
reductions act as a spur to the macro economy.
2.34 Peaks in office construction have been observed
to occur on an average of 14-27 months after peaks in the
nominal interest rate according to Kling & McCue [8].
(Once again highlighting real estate's time lag effect.)
Yet the theory of the lower interest rate catalyst is only
accurate in the short term. In the longer scenarios the
increased productivity born of these rates will in itself
foster an over-built state, and eventually cause the
nominal rate to recover. Thus the nominal rate is both
cyclical in and 'of itself, and influential to the greater
of cycles in the office space market.
2.35 Inflationary trends, and the classic role of real
estate as a hedge against them, have been important factors
in the 1980's office space market. The holding period of
office space as an investment is strongly correlated to the
escalation, decline, or stability of the inflation rate.
Higher inflation erodes the real value of tax depreciation
benefits which have acted as such a catalyst to real estate
since 1981. As the relative tax advantage diminishes,
investment capital is rerouted for more sheltered
environments, causing a construction slow down.
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Furthermore, high inflation severely discounts income
streams and lowers the value of capital gains benefits.
Developers and owners try to offset these effects by
charging higher sales prices for their assets, which in
itself contributes to the general inflationary trend.
Inflation can be offset by using shorter depreciable tax
lives for real assets. This technique was the cornerstone
of the Tax Act of 1981 and the Accelerated Cost Recovery
System. The tax act provided such a boost to construction,
that eventually the government determined that it was
losing revenues and reversed the act in 1986. Conversely,
lower inflation strengthens the office market, by
preserving tax benefits and income flows.
2.36 Leveraging, and its relation to the inflation
rate are intrinsically connected to investments in the
office market. The holding period of fully leveraged assets
is governed by the inflation rate. In prolonged periods of
high inflation, office buildings (and the leases held on
them) should be held for full tax life to take maximum
advantage of depreciation. When such assets are fully
depreciated, and no longer provide shelter from taxes, they
should be sold soon after. Quick disposal maximizes the
owner's value (which would otherwise be subject to
unsheltered N.O.I. and discounted capital gains), and
renews the asset's depreciable life which is good for the
macroeconomy. With the advent of flexible rate debt
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instruments, low inflation now extends its positive effects
to leveraging (though under traditional fixed rate
obligations high inflation favored leveraging) [11]. In a
low inflation period, the borrower's fixed capital costs
maintain lower nominal and real costs. Costs are held
down, profits stabilize, and the industry as a whole
becomes more predictable and efficient (which benefits
everyone). This process is even more critical to mortgagees
of adjustable rate instruments, whose exposure is high, or
who have to buy expensive rate caps. Unleveraged assets, a
rarity in the office market where buildings now command
prices in the hundred millions, should be held until the
expiration of their tax life when inflation is low, and
indefinitely if inflation is high [11].
2.37 Literature on the office space market often
advances the opinion that the eighties are unprecedented,
and constantly setting new record highs and lows,
especially in the field of vacancy. The current national
office space glut and excess vacancies levels are expected
to last longer than in the past, with double digit
vacancies until the mid-1990's.
2.38 Changes in rent are influenced by the prevailing
vacancy rates. The level of rent can be approximated in
any given period using a distributed lag factor of past
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vacancy rates. The most commonly accepted time lag is 3
years [10]. This represents the amount of time which the
market must remain soft before the owners will offer rent
concessions to encourage absorption. Conversely, if the
market is tight for an extended period, rents will rise to
a point that will dampen absorption. From the supply side
of the office market, the lag between vacancies and new
construction is due to a market's slow vacancy-rent
adjustment, and indecisiveness on the part of developers.
Supply is more price (vacancy) elastic than demand, and
fosters market instability [10].
2.39 Variations in the vacancy rate reflect a desired
vacancy rate, and are significant in determining price and
output responses to changes in demand. Reactions of output
and prices to demand changes are strongest when the gap
between desired and actual inventories is largest.
Inventory holding is also largest when the related marginal
carrying costs are lowest. Landlords react to fluctuations
in demand by building up or drawing down their inventories
of unlet or vacant office space.
2.40 Normal vacancy rate equals that occurring over a
long span of time. The actual vacancy rate is that
occurring at the moment. Landlords establish a desired
inventory of vacant space which they are willing to hold on
to. This affords the landlord the luxury of flexibility in
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dealing with demand fluctuations and tenant turnover
(especially in cases where the leases are long term). The
landlords ability to respond to unexpected favorable events
in the market is enhanced by holding on to this space.
Essentially it allows the landlord to speculate upon the
vacancy rate. The holding of this space is to the mutual
benefit of the landlord and the tenant. Landlords can
raise rents of rented space to cover the costs of the
vacancies (ie passing them through). Such an inventory
will also allow tenants to reduce their search costs, as
well as the moving costs of occupying the new space. They
are also freed from the obligations and expenses of a long
term precommitments. Vacant space can therefore generate
higher per square footage rents for the land lords, and
save tenants money when this optimal macro-economic balance
is maintained [9]. Conversely, if vacancies are too high,
landlords will lower rents to reduce the stock to a desired
level. Yet for landlords whose inventory carrying costs
are constant, the level of vacant office space is not
critical (ie his exposure is minimal even if prices start
to rise). Obviously these landlords have greater waiting
power. Current vacancy rates have tended to increase in
older buildings, as tenants favor newer structures. The
rent adjustment process may also be influenced by taxes.
2.41 Vacancies greatly influence the setting of short
run rent levels, while risk increases directly as a
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function of rents. Normal vacancies strongly correlate with
the costs of carrying and leasing office space, and the
level of demand uncertainty prevailing. On the demand side,
holding vacancies has economic value to the tenants and
also reduces the costs of future relocations. Finally, the
greater the current fixed operating costs for commercial
office space, the greater the cost of holding vacant space,
and hence the lower the vacancy rate (due to a drop in
rent).
2.42 Each of the three booms office construction
have been matched by peaks in office vacancy. (The City of
Boston provided a typical illustration of this national
trend- see Fig. 2 on next page.) This is a function of the
industry's cyclical self-regulation, and the inability of
developers and operators to forecast the industry
correctly. Developers tend to initiate projects only if
the future product would be profitable in the current
market. This is erroneous, because the market tends to
change during the development life of the building,
especially if it began towards the end of a favorable phase
in the cycle. Unfortunately, economic cycles are a matter
of hindsight, and a developer usually can not determine his
position in the cycle as it is occurring. Under favorable
economic conditions newly available space is absorbed as it
comes out on the market, keeping it "soft". During periods
of economic downturns, the market becomes "tight", with
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Fig: 2 Boston Office Vacancy Rates '61 to '85 &
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large amounts of space becoming and remaining available.
Due to these market inefficiencies the office space cycle
is set in motion, and eventually completes and repeats
itself.
2.43 Office space Cycles and trends are also being
examined for relative merit by demographics and a inter-
city rank order. J.S. Hekman contends that local office
construction reflects rent levels and growth in office
related employment for a given market, independent of
national trends [8]. Therefore office space is unique by
location, and it is flawed logic to assume an applicable
national model. According to Hekman, a "shift and share"
problem derails any unified theory of office space values
and performance. Specifically, each city has its own rate
of growth or "shift". These rates of growth, even if the
same for different cities, are based upon intrinsically
unique characteristics that may or may not be subject to
change across cities. "Share" is a description of the
specificity of employment mix to a given city. For example,
Boston and Houston may have had a similar size work force,
but employed these people in different quantities in
different industries. The respective response of these
cities to macro economic changes (in this case the global
drop in the price of oil), is therefore very different.
Boston's work force has so far proven recession-proof to
those same factors which have plagued the oil cities.
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2.44 Despite the relative decline of American
manufacturing's role in the total economy, its proportion
of white-collar workers has increased since W.W. II. While
layoffs and automation have reduced the number of blue
collar workers, the need for centralized administrative
functions and other non-manufacturing services has grown.
Similarly, F.I.R.E industries have increased their labor
force from 3 million in the fifties, to 12 million by the
mid-eighties. In most areas the bulk of this expansion has
occurred since the sixties, with major expansions happening
in the 1980's. Such patterns in labor demography and office
employment are directly reflected in office space
developments. Net absorption of office space closely
parallels the level of office employment, and the supply of
office space has grown from 1 billion sq ft in 1955 to over
3.8 billion sq ft today.
2.45 The move out of the cities has created two
distinct and competing office markets around most major
urban centers; the suburban and the downtown. The location
option has been the concern of a changing clientele over
the last three decades, and has been influenced by
everything from technological advances to fashion.
Convenience, cost effectiveness, access to labor, and tax
incentives, have all motivated the development of suburban
office space. The occupation of that space can be
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classified firm type; either executive or clerically
intensive [1]. Executive oriented businesses are primarily
sensitive to "linkages", while clerical firms respond to
commuting costs. Thus knowledge of a firm's business is
above all else, the key to determining whether or not it
will opt for downtown or suburban office space.
2.46 "Linkages" represent the need for face-to-face
interaction among offices and their access to amenities
[1]. The availability of various support services,
communications technology, and the joint use of data
processing facilities is also covered by the term. In
statistical tests, the a given firm's attraction towards
the downtown positively correlated with the frequency,
variety and urgency of meetings it must accomplish with
other offices.
2.47 Personnel commuting costs tend to counteract the
effects of linkages. When a business's employees mostly
reside in the suburbs, the cost and effort for them to
commute to a downtown location is high (if not
prohibitive). If the business is not willing to compensate
its employees for high commuting costs then its must bring
itself to its labor source; it should locate in the
suburbs. (Though often the person who selects the office
site or owns the company picks it in relation to his own
house.) Since commuting costs effect the wage rate, they
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also effect a firm's ability to bid on a specific location,
thus many firms find themselves priced out of the downtown
option, especially if they are very labor intensive.
2.48 Parking costs represent an associated commuter
expense. If they are substantial, as they would be for any
major downtown American city, an employer faces the risk of
loosing potential employees over the cost. This tendency
would be reduced in a city with a well developed public
transportation system (such as Washington), or one which
was created in the automobile age (such as Los Angeles). In
a city that has neither amenity parking would become a
major problem. In such a situation firms with the small
parking requirements will tend to locate in downtown
offices. (Big Eight Public Accounting Firms in Boston
represent the worst case scenario. All are located
downtown, serviced by mediocre public transportation, have
large parking requirements, and rely upon cars to transport
their auditors out to clients.) If the business is torn
between the need for downtown linkages and suburban labor
costs, it will have to prioritize one or the other, or
select an in-between location. During the eighties, large
technological advances in all aspects of linkages and
rising wages have tilted the location dilemma in favor of
the suburbs. However, this does not indicate a whole sale
flight of all businesses to the suburbs, some business can
only succeed in a downtown location. Because of the
Page 35
combination of linkages and personnel commuting costs,
downtown firms are becoming increasingly restricted to
certain industries.
2.49 The significance of linkages and personnel
commuting costs in the office location decision of is
beginning to fade. Rapid advances in electronic
communication, data processing and transportation, are
encouraging location regardless of face-to-face contacts,
and the prestige factor of the C.B.D. has faded. Workers in
the eighties now either tolerate long and expensive
commutes, or can avail themselves of greatly improved
public transportation, depending upon which city the work
in. In either case labor is proving itself more willing to
get itself to the job; not less.
2.50 The influence of a firm's age, and its stage in
the business live cycle have been extensively studied for
insight into office space location choice. One theory
suggests that new firms frequently locate downtown to avail
themselves of services, which they otherwise would have to
employ in-house. Then, as the business grows and matures,
it may then leave the downtown for cheaper suburban rents
to house an expanded staff. However, there are many
considerations that make firms reluctant to move. The high
cost of relocating, and severe interruptions to business
that accompany it, often keep firms anchored to their
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cramped downtown locations. Only when the benefits of a
move are clearly evident will the firms move. This
hesitation period adds credence to the age theory. Yet
statistical evidence has demonstrated that the desire to be
and remain downtown is most strongly related to the given
characteristics of a city, rather than the age of a firm.
There are many other considerations that influence a firm's
choice of office location. In varying degrees, companies,
firms tend to locate near the center of their geographic
market region. Firms must also consider the ability of a
given area to provide the type of space which they require,
the comparative cost efficiencies between different sites,
and the cost of transportation between the customer
location and office.
2.51 In the short run perspective the office space
available in a given city will be distributed according to
some mix of the above criteria. Yet these are all immediate
factors with a fleeting relevance to the current situation.
Over time all of the parameters above will change in
response to macro economic forces such as energy prices,
transportation improvements and urban growth or decay.
2.52 Employment levels outside of America's C.B.D.
have been increasing rapidly. Firms may opt for suburban
locations for many reasons, a major one of which is
invitation. Firms have often been viewed by suburbs with
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available white collar work forces as a good source of
revenue with little offsetting expense. The impact of
office space upon suburban infrastructure has proven
slight. The companies usually tie into the local sewer
system, but often provide their own security and
maintenance services. They make no additional use of the
school system (usually any communities largest expense),
and often bring income to local business. Their greatest
negative impact is traffic congestion. Yet often suburban
developers are willing to bear or split the necessary
improvements with the town. In general, suburban office
buildings represent potential expenses for the town (such
as fire fighting), and actual tax revenues. Resistance to
suburban office migration usually comes from wealthier
communities who favor zero growth. They oppose any change
to the character of their community, and are wary of
possible associated low income housing needs for the
employees. They also argue, that office buildings situated
in their town provide benefits (such as employment) to
other towns. The town can block proposed office space by
means of zoning, which developers are becoming increasingly
savvy in circumventing. There are situations office
development is sometimes solicited by a well to do town,
especially when it is viewed as a lesser evil than a
shopping mall who happens to be after the same location.
2.53 Currently the office space market is affected by
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demand increases, the source of which can be traced to
certain events. In January 1981 the depreciable lives of
real estate assets were shortened, making them in to a more
attractive investment. (This act opened the office market
up to syndication, which did a thriving tax shelter
business until the tax reform act of 1986). Secondly, in
December 1982 banks were deregulated and allowed to offer
insured money markets funds. This created a dramatic
increase in the supply of funds available to finance the
development of new office space. Yet, this same
deregulation has also increased the cost of real capital,
which has forced businesses to use their existing space
more effectively rather than expand. This effect is
coupled with the high transaction costs inherent to
buildings, whose irreversability in the short term can
scare investors away.
2.54 Wheaton [10] provides three forecasts of the
future office market based upon the previously detailed
market characteristics. The Base forecast: smooth but slow
growth over the next 6 years with vacancy rates reaching
18% by the end of the decade. The Recession forecast: A
strong national recession will start by 1988 followed by a
quick recovery in 1990. The duration of this cycle will
also be about six years, and vacancies will be pushed
upwards to 20%. The Growth Forecast: the national office
market will experience steady overall growth, with a
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dramatic shift into the service economy. Vacancy will peak
at 12%. None of these forecasts predict a single digit
vacancy rate, because both sides of the market must respond
to economic changes. Demand and supply usually offset one
another in order to avoid extreme conditions.
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Section Three: Components of Office Space Performance (3.1
to 3.6).
3.1 As a result of the histories examined, the
literature surveyed and the data collected, this thesis has
identified several main issues that influence the value of
office space in the C.B.D. and the suburbs. These issues
impact the national market as a whole, and the Boston urban
market in particular. The manner in which they interact in
a given urban area, and effect the C.B.D. and suburban
office populations within that area, directly determine
which of the two will maintain the greater value.
3.2 The health of a C.B.D. or suburban office
population can be ascertained from the associated levels of
construction. High construction usually indicate high
office space values, and the developer's perception that
his/her building will not lower those values through
oversupply. Provided that supply and demand are relatively
balanced, the developer's risk is exposure becomes
local and national economic cycles. These events may
dramatically increase or decrease office space values in
the C.B.D., the suburbs, or both. Often there is a lag
effect, in which the suburbs lead the decline, and are then
slower to recover [7]. The more recession proof a given
building or area, (via a tenant, an industry, the
government etc.) the higher the associated value.
Generally, the C.B.D. and the suburbs do not always respond
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to economic cycles simultaneously.
3.3 C.B.D. rent levels tend to be higher than in the
suburbs based on a variety of reasons. Primarily, C.B.D.
buildings experience a variety of expenses that are
intrinsically higher than in the suburbs, and must be
passed on to the tenants. Operating expenses, cost of
land, construction costs and taxes are all higher in the
C.B.D., and require higher rents to offset them. Non-
expense factors also drive up C.B.D. rents. Prestige
factors, scarcity of buildable sites, and a long permitting
process all cost more in the C.B.D. than in the suburbs.
These factors further subdivide the C.B.D. itself,
creating more or less expensive downtown addresses.
Although the C.B.D.'s higher rent levels are offset by
higher expenses, C.B.D. N.O.I tends to exceed its suburban
counterparts. This higher N.O.I. is a major factor
contributing to the greater value to investors of C.B.D.
office space.
3.4 Absorption levels and vacancy rates help determine
office space values, and tend to be inversely related. High
absorption rates raise rent levels in markets where space
is scarce, and lowers them where it is overabundant.
Conversely, high vacancies lower rents to encourage
absorption, and low vacancies keep them high to take
advantage of a strong market. While they are inversely
related, absorption and vacancy are not perfectly
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synchronized, and the strength of one does not absolutely
mean a weakness in the other. Therefore, both vacancy and
absorption, through their influence on rent, help determine
the value of office space in any given market. Finally,
these rates, like construction, are susceptible to national
and local trends. Yet both absorption and vacancy tend to
be much more volatile on the urban area level than
nationally.
3.5 These basic determinants of value were
quantitatively examined by use of secondary data. The
N.O.I. data allows for the manipulation of income and
expense categories that compared relative office value
across and within seven cities (which included Boston).
The specific Boston building population data provided
measurements of total available area, total occupied and
available area, vacancy rates and absorption, that compared
C.B.D. and suburban values. The combination of these two
sources allowed a risk and reward analysis between and
within the seven cities (holding period gain), and the
calculation of C.B.D. and suburban portfolio values for the
Boston urban area.
3.6 Given the role of construction, rent, absorption
and vacancy as determinants of the value of office space,
and the research, data and analyses conducted by this
thesis, the following assumption about office space value
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was tested: that in general, the value of equivalent
amounts of C.B.D. office space exceeds that of suburban
office. Specifically, during the years 1970-1986 for C.B.D.
office space, and 1975-1986 for suburban office space, the
value of the former exceeded that of the later (in those
years where comparison was possible) both nationally and
locally in Boston. Furthermore, from the perspective of an
investor in Boston office space, if the property was held
for the entire period, he/she would have received a return
on investment in C.B.D. office space that was equivalent
or greater than in the suburbs at substantially reduced
risk.
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Section Four: Data (4.1 to 4.4) Methodology j45 to 4.13)
and Results (4.14 to 4.36)
4.1 The main data sources for this thesis are as
follows; the annual Experience Exchange Reports from the
Building Owners and Managers Association (BOMA) for the
years 1970 to 1986, and the Spaulding and Slye Boston Area
Office Reports, quarterly from 1979 to April 1988.
Additional include: the Capitalization Rate reports from
the American Council of Life Insurance Companies, quarterly
from 1970 to 1978. Several major economic measures such as
the Frank Russell Indices, Gross National Product data, the
Consumer Price Index, and the Constant Value of the dollar
(100 = 1970). The AA Industrial Bond ratings and the 10
Year Treasury Bill Rate from 1970 to 1986. Various
publications by the Boston Redevelopment Authority. A
survey of prevailing pertinent literature on the office
space market, both nationally and Boston specific. Finally,
interviews with persons both influencing and influenced by
the office space industry. These sources have provided the
data for a series of tests of the basic assumption about
the office space market.
4.2 According to BOMA, the "Experience Exchange
Reports provided published tables of operating income and
expense data for office buildings throughout North America.
The data is based upon a voluntary survey of building
owners and managers whose buildings represent a wide and
varied selection of office space. Building owners and
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managers receive the survey forms in January of each year
and submit them prior to the March 15th deadline. BOMA
International reviews the forms and compiles the data
statistically into tables during April and May: publication
and distribution of the book occurs in June" [3]. While
basic gathering and processing procedures have remained
constant since the 1950's, scope of the analysis has
increased over time adding both new cities and types of
analyses. Suburban data collection begin in 1975.
4.3 The Spaulding and Slye data represents a
comprehensive broker's survey of most of the existing
buildings in the greater metro Boston Area. This series
lists the buildings individually, giving their dates of
completion, number of floors, total rentable area, sq ft
available, estimated rent per sq ft (rents are based upon
owner operator quotes or S&S's own estimation), and
percentage of vacancy. The reports are updated on a
quarterly basis, and released in January, April, July and
October of each year since 1979. The Spaulding & Slye
reports are generally held as Boston's most comprehensive
publicly available office market data source.
4.4 This study examined a selection of nineteen
downtown buildings (see appendix #2) and eighty-two
suburban building in the Boston metropolitan area. All
cases these buildings were completed before 1973. The
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downtown buildings include such Boston landmarks as the
Prudential Tower, the State Street Bank building, and the
Bank of Boston Building. The portfolio ranges in size from
1.3 million square feet down to 45,000 square feet, with an
average size of 436,503 sq ft. The suburban sample included
such buildings as the Technology Square buildings in
Cambridge, New England Executive Park in Burlington, and
the Bear Hill Road and Totten Pond Road Buildings in
Waltham. The largest building in the portfolio is 751,000
sq ft, the smallest is 15,000 sq ft, and the average size
is 66,093 sq ft.
4.5 Using income statement data from the BOMA reports,
a series of both downtown and suburban N.O.I. for several
cities was tabulated for comparative purposes. These cities
include: Boston, Chicago, Denver, Los Angeles, Minneapolis,
San Francisco and Washington D.C. The cities were selected
to represent a broad spectrum, and for their continuity
throughout the BOMA data (1970 -1986 for Downtown and 1975
to 1986 for suburban). Chicago and Los Angeles represent a
contrast to Boston due to their immense populations and
geographical area. San Francisco, Denver, Minneapolis and
Washington D.C., more closely resemble Boston, and provide
a valuable comparison.
4.6 The Spaulding and Slye data was used to determine
general characteristic for the entire Metropolitan Boston
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office space population. By aggregating quarterly data,
gross totals for urban and suburban office space were
derived in the following areas: total rentable area, total
available sq ft, rates of vacancy, supply added in a given
year, Total occupied Space, Annual absorption, and average
building rent. These totals were applicable to the years
1979 to 1987, and the results can be observed in
appendix #3.
4.7 N.O.I. tables for Boston and the six other cities




- Construction (tenant Improvements)
- Fixed Charges (Insurance & Property Taxes)
= Net Operating Income
In all cases the data for these accounts represents the
median value for the population of buildings surveyed.
These populations differ widely, from 8 buildings for some
cities in some years to over 60 in others. This data is
also only from BOMA members, and therefore may be biased
due to self-selection of each respondents in a given city.
4.8 N.O.I. was compared among the seven cities
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examined, and on a urban versus suburban level for the same
cities. Average N.O.I. for urban and suburban populations
were calculated for comparative purposes. Boston N.O.I.
in both situations was compared to the mean for trend and
timing differences. N.O.I. for both Boston and the other
sample cities compared to other major financial indicators
such as G.N.P. data for gross private investment in non-
residential property, the 10 year T-Bill rate, the AA
industrial bond rate, the C.P.I. index and the Constant
value of the dollar. (See summary N.O.I. tables on next
two pages).
4.9 Data from the aggregated Spaulding and Slye
reports was used to examine relationships of Rent, Vacancy
and Absorption, and in some cases, their correlation to
N.O.I. In each category data for the period 1979 to 1987
was analyzed for both the suburban and urban office space,
both individually and in comparison to one another.
Individual tests included: Urban versus Suburban Vacancy
Rates for Boston, Urban versus Suburban Total Square
Footage in the Boston Metropolitan Area, Urban versus
Suburban Absorption Levels for Boston, Urban versus
Suburban Rental Rates for Boston, Urban and Suburban N.O.I.
versus Applicable Rents for the period 1970 -1986, Suburban
and Urban Indexed changes in Rent, Absorption level,
Vacancy, Total Area Available and N.O.I., and a comparison
of Asked for and Average Earned Rent in Suburban and Urban
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TABLE 1: 7-City Mean C.B.D, and Suburban N.0.1. 1970 - 1986
Downtown Office Space:
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976
- -- --- --- ---- - --- - --- --- - -------------
operating Expenses $1.94 $2.08 $2.16 $2.40 $2.63 $2.81 $2.77
Construction $0.22 $ $0 $0.22 $0.26 $0.17 $0.12 $.13
Fixed Charges $1.01 $1.06 $1.13 $1.27 $1.35 $1.21 $34
-- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - --------------
Total Expenses $3.17 $3.42 $3.51 $3.92 $4.14 $4.14 $4.24
Rental 1ncoe $5.46 $5.55 $5.58 $6.21 $6.33 $7.10 $7.15
N. . 2.29 .1 $2.07 2.29 $2.19 $.96 .91 ------------
s o $.9 213 $.7 $2.2 9 $2.19 $96 $.9
1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986
$3.11 $3.48 $3.87 $4.30 $4.81 35.06 $5.06 $5.24 $5.42 $4.93
$0.16 $0.40 $0.23 $0.24 $0.08 $0.15 $0.21 $0.19 $0.51 $0.24
$1.28 $1.48 $1.40 $1.53 $1.79 $1,87 $2,33 $2.47 $2.65 $2.89
$4,55 $5.37 $5.50 $6.06 $6.68 $7.08 $7.60 $7.90 $8.59 $8.06
$7.72 $8.33 $9.36 $10.55 $11.21 $13.00 $14.34 $15.42 $17.20 $17.68















$3.17 $3.42 $3.51 $3.92 $4.14 $4.14 $4.24 $4.55 $5.37 $5.50 $6.06 $6.68 $7.08 $7.60 $7.90 $8.59 $8.06 $6.31 $5.53 $7.852.38 2.61 2.69 2.71 2.89 2.40 1.46 2.43 2.81 2.43 2.35 247 2.20 2.13 2,05 2.00 1.84 2.30 $2.40 2.04
Suburban Office Space:









N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A $2.22 $2.60 $3.04 $2.92 $3.12 $3.33 $3.72 $4.23 $4.54 $4.42 $4.19 $4.15N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A $0.18 $0.18 $0.13 $0.52 $0.21 $0.34 $0.10 $0.18 $0.17 $0.18 $0.56 $0.20N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A $0.87 $1.01 $0.97 $1.02 $0.97 $1.17 $1.21 $1.25 $1.43 $1.57 $1.96 $1.78
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A $3.28 $3.79 $4.13 $4.46 $4.30 $4.84 $5.03 $5.66 $6.14 $6.17 $6.72 $6.13
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A $5.90 16.16 $6.92 $8.42 $7.72 $8.83 $9.63 $10.75 $11.20 $12.59 $14.62 $13.52
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$4.84 $5.03 $5.66 $6.14 $6.17 $6.72 $6.13 $5.05 N/A
2.21 2.09 2.11 221 1.96 1.85 1.83 2.17 N/A
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TABLE 2: Boston C.B.D. and Suburban N,0.1. 1970 - 1986
Downtown Office Space:
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975t 1976t 1977 1978 1979% 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 '75-'86 '70-'86 '82-'86
perating Expenses $1.85 $1.7? $2.07 $2.68 $2.91 $3.84 $3.29 $3.61 $4.54 $4.66 $5.13 $5.15 $5.26 $5.23 $5.62 $5.90 $5.41Construction $0.20 $0.18 $0.13 $0.14 $0.10 $0.15 $0.05 $0.02 $0.05 $0.30 $0.40 $0.03 $0.12 $0.10 $0.17 $0.75 $0.21Fixed Charges $1.73 $1.80 $1.92 $2.11 $1.73 $1.69 $1.94 $1.62 $2.28 $2.23 $2.49 $2.84 $2.83 $3.24 $3.45 $3.59 $3.91
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total Expenses $3.77 $3.75 $4.12 $4.93 $4.74 $5.68 $5.28 $5.26 $6.87 $7.19 $8.03 $8.02 $8.21 $8.57 $9.24 $10.24 $9.53
:ental Income $6.68 $6.41 $6.65 $7.08 $6.47 $7.97 $7.89 $8.81 $9.46 $944 $11.18 $11.61 $11.63 $14.77 $17.22 $17.30 $17.86














$3.77 $3.75 $4.12 $4.93 $4.74 $5.68 $5.28 $5.26 $6.87 $7.19 $8.03 $8.02 $8.21 $8.57 $9.24 $10.24 $9.53 $7.68 $6.67 $9.162.30 2.41 2.63 3.29 3.74 3.48 3.02 2.48 3.66 4.20 3.55 3.23 3.40 2.38 2.16 2.45 2.14 3.01 2.97 2.51
Suburban Office Space:
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975t 1976t 1977t 1978t 199: 1980 1981 1982g 1983 1984 1985 1986
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Operating Expenses N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A $2.51 $3.25 $2.96 $3.02 $3.52 $4.01 $3.74 $4.64 $5.54 $5.57 $4.35 4.78
Construction N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A $0.11 $0.13 $0.12 $0.47 $0.38 $0.17 $0.30 $0.26 $0.22 $0.04 $0.11 $0.22
Fxed Charges N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A $0.75 $0.99 $0.81 $0.95 $0.97 $2.05 $1.90 $1.90 $1.90 $2.53 $1.95 $216
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total Expenses N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A $3.37 $4.36 $3.89 $4.44 $4.87 $6.22 $5.94 $6.80 $7.66 $8.14 $6.41 $7.16lental Income N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A $6.27 $6.34 $6.32 $6.72 $7.46 $11.98 $9.56 $9.66 $9.75 $12.58 $13.91 $12.34
N.../ N/A /A /A NA $289 $.98 2.8--------------------------------------------------------------------------
























$3.37 $4.36 $3.89 $4.44 $4.87 $6.22 $5.94 $6.80 $7.66 $8.14 $6.41 $7.16 $5.77 N/A
2.17 3.20 2.59 2.94 2.89 2.08 2.64 3.38 4.67 2.83 1.85 2.38 $2.80 N/A












4.10 Holding Period Returns were calculated from the
seven city mean C.B.D. and suburban N.O.I. trends from 1976
-1986, Boston C.B.D. and suburban N.O.I. trends for the
same period, and the seven city C.B.D. and Boston C.B.D.
N.O.I. trends from 1971-1986. The holding period return was
calculated using the following formula: [(N.O.I. during the
period + imputed sales proceeds) / imputed acquisition
cost] - 1.
-- -----------------------------------------------
[(N.O.I. yr.1 + (N.O.I. yr.1/Cap Rate yr. 1))
/ (N.O.I. yr.o/Cap Rate yr.o))] -1
-- -----------------------------------------------
Holding Period Return yr. 1
Statistical measurements of Means, Standard Deviation and
Coefficient of Variation were then applied to the results
to yield reward to risk analysis.
4.11 Using N.O.I. averages from the BOMA data, and
total population square footage from the Spaulding and Slye
reports, values of specific buildings as well as total
portfolios were estimated. Trend value patterns for all
buildings in the portfolio were generate utilizing the
Gordon Constant Growth Dividend Valuation Model: N.O.I.o
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(1+g)/(ke-g) * occupied square footage o = capitalized
value of a given building (N.B. o = year zero). In this
model N.O.I.o (1+g) = the value of next years N.O.I. today,
and g is the growth rate (over 17 years for downtown office
space and 12 years for suburban office space). Ke is the
required return to equity, which in this model is the
American Council of Life Insurance's New England Office
Building Cap Rate (see appendix #4).
4.12 When the N.O.I. capitalization model was applied
to the suburban and urban office building populations as a
whole, value and trends of the entire metropolitan area
from 1979 to 1986 were observed. The model summarized the
values of both portfolios of buildings generated by the
capitalization model. This value was then divided by the
total number of square feet in the given portfolio in order
to obtain a value per square foot. Average value per
square foot by given year was then multiplied by the total
amount of rentable area in both the suburban and urban
Boston office space markets to obtain a valuation.
4.13 This model produced valuations for all buildings
in the portfolio and populations as a whole that were
tested in several ways. The value patterns of individual
buildings from each portfolio were examined over their
applicable test life span (1970-1986 for urban and 1975-
1986 for suburban). These buildings were then compared to
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one another both among and across their urban-suburban
categories. (Specific buildings examined were: Downtown:
The Prudential Tower, State Street Bank, One Center Plaza,
and in the Suburbs: One Heritage Drive, 7 New England
Executive Park, and the Coolidge Bank Building.) The
indexed change in value of total office stock was then
compared to indicators such as the National and Eastern
Frank Russell Indexes for Income and Appreciation.
4.14 C.B.D. seven city mean N.O.I. for the period 1970
to 1986 had a low of $2.07 per sq ft, a high of $9.62 per
sq ft, and an average of $4.37 per sq ft. For the seventeen
year period covered, seven city mean N.O.I. grew at an
annual rate of 9%. Yet this growth was neither gradual nor
smooth, it proceeded in a series of phases that had stable
N.O.I. for several years with periodic large increases.
These phases are summarized below:
Seven City Mean N.O.I. Increases
| 1970-1974 : $2.19 | N/A
| 1975-1978 : $3.00 : 36.85%:
| 1979-1981 : $4.29 : 42.99%:
| 1982-1983 : $6.33 : 47.32%|
1984-1986 | $9.12 | 44.11%|
Rental rates during the same period exhibited a similar
pattern to N.O.I., growing at an annual rate of 7%, while
expenses relatively constant growing at 6% annually.
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Therefore, the increase in the seven city mean C.B.D.
N.O.I. was primarily driven the by strong later period
growth in rents that were not offset by corresponding
expenses. When the growth in N.O.I. is examined for the
period 1982 to 1986, the average N.O.I. was $7.68, with a
growth rate of 10% annually, which illustrates the
acceleration of N.O.I. growth in the later part of the
study period (see Fig. 3 on next page).
4.15 Suburban seven city mean N.O.I. for the period
1975 to 1986 had a low of $2.37 per sq ft, a high of $7.90
per sq ft, and an average of $4.64 per sq ft. For the
twelve year period covered, seven city mean N.O.I. also
grew at an annual rate of 9%. N.O.I. can be summarized as
follows:
Seven City Mean Suburban N.O.I. Increases
| 1975-1977 : $2.60 | N/A
| 1978-1981 : $4.00 : 53.85%:
| 1982-1983 : $5.08 : 27.00%:
1984-1986 $7.24 | 42.52%:
As with their urban counterparts, suburban seven city mean
rents grew faster and greater than corresponding expenses.
For the period examined, rents averaged $9.69 at an annual
growth rate of 7%, while expenses averaged $5.05 at an
annual growth rate of 5%. Also, as in the C.B.D. case, all
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Fig 3. Downtown Boston Vs. 7-City Mean
Office Space N.O.I









-+- 7-City Mean N.O.I.
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major measures of N.O.I. greatly accelerated during the
1982 to 1986 period. N.O.I. increased by 37%, rents by 29%,
and expenses by 37% (see Fig. 4 on next page).
4.16 C.B.D. N.O.I. for the seven city mean exceeded
their suburban counterparts for 10 out of the 12 years from
1975 to 1986. The maximum absolute difference was $2.23,
the minimum was $0.08, and the average difference was
$0.64. The growth in the rate of difference was 17%
annually, while the actual trend was divided into two
phases:
Increases between C.B.D
& Suburban Seven City Mean N.O.I.
| 1975-1982 | $0.24 : N/A
1983-1986 | $1.43 | 495.83%
The average rental rates for the C.B.D. was $11.59 compared
to $9.69 for the suburbs, a difference of $1.90 or
16.39%. Operating expenses were lower in the suburbs,
$5.05 versus $6.31 in the C.B.D., but this difference of
$1.26 (24.95%) was less than the difference in rents of
$1.90. As observed in the individual C.B.D. and suburban
cases, all pertinent N.O.I. measures accelerated after
1982. The average difference in N.O.I. for the 1982 to
1986 period was $1.31, an increase of 105% from the 1975 to
1986 average (see Fig. 5 on page 59).
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Fig 5. Downtown 7-City Mean N.O.I. Vs.
Suburban 7-City Mean N.O.I.
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4.17 Boston C.B.D. N.O.I. for the period 1970 to 1986
had a low of $1.73 per sq ft, a high of $8.33 per sq ft,
and an average of $3.82 per sq ft. For the seventeen year
period covered, Boston C.B.D. N.O.I. grew at an annual rate
of 6%, 3% less than the seven city average for the same
period. N.O.I. growth was much smoother than the average,
having three major periods of consistency compared to the
seven city average of five (see Fig. 3).
Boston C.B.D. N.O.I. and Increases
| 1970-1979 : $2.53 : N/A |
1980-1982 | $3.39 | 33.99%
1983-1986 | $7.39 | 117.99%
Rental rates during the same period were less consistent
than N.O.I., changing more frequently, with an average
level of $10.49 and a growth rate of 6%. (compared to the
seven city mean average of $9.89 at 7%). Expenses for the
period averaged $6.67, and grew annually at 6%, with the
seven city mean average being $5.53 also at 6% growth. As
in the case of the seven city mean C.B.D. N.O.I. was
driven the by strong later period growth in rents not
matched by expenses. Like all previous cases of N.O.I.
examined, there was substantial growth after 1982. Average
N.O.I. for the period 1982 to 1986 was $6.60, an increase
of 73% over the 1970 to 1986 period level of $3.82. Rental
and expense rates also increased dramatically over the
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later period.
4.18 Boston suburban N.O.I. for the period 1975 to
1986 had a low of $1.98 per sq ft, a high of $7.50 per sq
ft, and an average of $3.64 per sq ft. For the twelve year
period covered, Boston suburban N.O.I. grew at an annual
rate of 5%. The N.O.I. can be summarized as follows:
Boston Suburban N.O.I. Increases
: 1975-1979 : $2.44 | N/A
| 1980-1983 | $3.58 | 46.72% |
1984-1986 | $5.71 | 59.50%
Like the previous trends, suburban rents grew faster and
greater than corresponding expenses. For the period
examined, rents averaged $9.41 at an annual growth rate of
6%, compared to the seven city average of $9.69 and 7%.
Expenses averaged $5.77 at an annual growth rate of 6%,
compared to the seven city average of $5.05 at 5%. Also,
as in the C.B.D. case, all major measures of N.O.I.
greatly accelerated during the 1982 to 1986 period. N.O.I.
increased by 21%, rents by 24%, and expenses by 25%,
compared to the seven city mean respective increases of
37%, 29%, and 37% (See Fig. 4).
4.19 Boston C.B.D. N.O.I. exceeded its suburban
counterpart for 7 out of the 12 years from 1975 to 1986.
The maximum absolute difference was $4.11, the minimum was
$0.03, and the average difference was $0.78. The growth in
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the rate of difference was 15% annually, (compared to the
seven city mean results of max. $2.23, min. $0.08, avg.
$0.64 and growth of 17%) while the actual trend was divided
into the same two phases as in the seven city mean
comparison:
Increases between C.B.D & Suburban Boston N.O.I.
| 1975-1982 : $0.78 : N/A
1983-1986 | $2.81 | 260.26%
The average rental rates for the C.B.D. was $12.09 compared
to $9.41 for the suburbs, a difference of $2.68 or 28%.
Operating expenses were lower in the suburbs, $5.77. versus
$7.68 in the C.B.D., but this difference of $1.91 (33%) was
exceeded by $0.77 per sq ft by the difference in rents
(which was greater than the $0.64 surplus for the seven
city mean case). As observed in the individual C.B.D. and
suburban cases, all pertinent N.O.I. measures accelerated
after 1982. The average difference in N.O.I. for the 1982
to 1986 period was $2.18, an increase of 179% from the 1975
to 1986 average, and greater than the respective seven city
mean growth of $1.31 at 105% (see Fig. 6 on next Page).
4.20 From the Spaulding and Slye data provided major
office space indicators for both C.B.D. and suburban
populations. These indicators included; rental rates,
absorption, total rentable area, total occupied space,
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N.O.I
total available square footage and vacancy, were examined
for period of 1979 to 1988 (except where comparisons with
N.O.I. data limit it to 1986).
4.21 As with N.O.I. data, rental rates were the key
driver that increased office space value. Also, as with
the N.O.I. data, C.B.D. rents were found to be far greater
than those of the suburbs, averaging $23.63 per sq ft





1979 $13.00 $10.50 $2.51
1980 $16.59 $12.30 $4.29
1981 $21.08 $14.70 $6.38
1982 $23.66 $17.10 $6.57
1983 $24.97 $17.70 $7.28
1984 $27.82 $19.26 $8.56
1985 $26.26 $20.37 $5.89
1986 $27.03 $20.15 $6.88
1987 $27.59 $19.96 $7.63
1988 $28.29 $19.84 $8.46
Averages: $23.63 $17.19 $6.44
The average rental difference was $6.44 for the entire
period with a growth rate of 13%, and $ 7.32 from 1982 to
1988, confirming the acceleration trends identified in the
N.O.I. studies. Actual rent for the C.B.D. population
attained a high of $28.29 in 1988, a low of $13.00 in 1979,
with an average of $23.63, and an annual growth rate of 8%.
Suburban rents reach a high of $20.37 in 1985, a low of
$10.50 in 1979, with an average of $17.19 and a annual
growth rate of 7%. The peak of suburban rents in 1985, and
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the continued growth of C.B.D. rentals through 1986 was
confirmed by the N.O.I. data.
4.22 Absorption for both populations was strong over
the entire period studied. The suburbs absorbed more space
on average per year than the C.B.D., at 563,665 sq ft
versus 483,443 sq ft respectively, for an annual average


















































C.B.D. absorption peaked in 1987 at 910,077 sq ft, and was
lowest in 1980 at 96,583, and was very volatile throughout
the study period. Suburban absorption peaked at 1,067,183
ft sq in 1986, with a low of 238,874 sq ft also in 1980.
Suburban absorption led C.B.D. absorption for seven out of
the ten test years. The difference in average absorption,
though higher for the suburbs did not necessarily correlate
to higher suburban values. Since absorption for both
populations is strong and relatively constant, the
indication is one of overall metropolitan area strength
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versus suburban versus C.B.D. predominance. Higher
suburban absorption undoubtedly reflects the lower rents
commanded by buildings in that population.
4.23 As with absorption, total rentable area, total
occupied space, and total available square footage were
more indicative of general market strength in the Boston
urban area, than quantifiers of comparative C.B.D. versus
suburban office space values. For the period under study,
urban total rentable area always exceeded the suburbs by an
average rate of 6,974,444 sq ft. This difference has
steadily declined over the last few years from a high of
over 10 million sq ft in 1979, to a low of under 4 million
in 1988 (although only two quarters of this year have been
completed at the time of this study). The size of both
office space populations now is relatively equal, with
greater growth having occurred in the suburbs during this
study period. Suburban office space growth exceeded C.B.D.
growth on an average of almost 200,000 sq ft per year, and
by as much as 450,000 sq ft in peak years. Offsetting this
excess in supply was Boston's lower amount of available
space and added supply, making existing downtown stock a
scarcer commodity in the suburbs and driving up its value.
Available supply has averaged over 1 million feet less per
year in the C.B.D. than in the suburbs, with the difference
growing dramatically over the last three years. (The
average difference for the last three years has been just
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under 2.3 million square feet, indicating that a scarce
resource is getting scarcer.) Added supply in the same
three year period has also been much smaller downtown, 1.9
million sq ft versus 2.8 million sq ft respectively,
further confirming the comparative scarcity of C.B.D.
versus suburban office space.
4.24 They key measure generated from the area and
absorption indicators in support of C.B.D. claim to greater
value, is the vacancy rate. The C.B.D. vacancy rate in the
1979 to 1988 period attained a high of 10.3% in 1985, a low
of 0.4% in 1980, and averaged 4.99%. Concurrently,
suburban vacancy rates had a high of 18.7% in 1896, a low




1979 2.4% 2.6% -0.25%
1980 0.4% 3.3% -2.86%
1981 1.3% 7.5% -6.21%
1982 3.0% 10.5% -7.47%
1983 3.5% 14.5% -11.00%
1984 6.4% 11.9% -5.52%
1985 10.3% 16.1% -5.76%
1986 9.6% 18.7% -9.10%
1987 6.9% 16.6% -9.67%
1988 6.1% 15.9% -9.82%
Averages: 4.99% 11.75% -6.77%
Vacancies in the C.B.D. have been lower than in the suburbs
each year of the period examined, and averaged 6.77% less
than in the suburbs. The magnitude of difference between
the two populations grew at a rate of 44% since 1979, with
a minimum difference of 0.25% in 1979, and a maximum of 11%
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in 1983. The average rate of difference for the last three
years was been 9.53%.
4.25 These vacancy measures indicated a strong C.B.D.
office space market from 1979 to 1988, that had little
problem absorbing new office space as it came on line. On
average the downtown market is occupied 93% of each year's
added space at a vacancy rate just below five percent. This
combination made Boston one of the strongest C.B.D. office
space markets in the country. The suburban office space
market, which was also strong by national standards, was
weak compared to the downtown. Occupancy of new product
stood at 81%, twelve percentage points less than the
C.B.D., at a vacancy rate 11.75%. The suburban market
absorbed less space, at a slower pace and for less rent
than the C.B.D.. Furthermore, while the C.B.D. market had
not yet to abated its growth by the end of this study, the
suburbs had already peaked, and the gap between them
grown larger for the last two years of the study.
4.26 The Holding Period Return model (see paragraph
4.10 for formula) yielded risk and return analysis for
seven city mean and Boston N.O.I. trends for both the
suburbs and C.B.D..
4.27 Holding Period Returns (H.P.R.) for the seven
city mean C.B.D. N.O.I. for the period 1971 to 1986 had a
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high of 50.74%, and a low of -3.43%. Mean return for the
population, 23.36%, with a risk factor of 16.69%. H.P.R.
for the suburban seven city mean N.O.I. had a high of
56.09%, and a low of -9.75% for the period 1976 to 1986.























STD. DEV. 16.69% 20.64%
COEF. VAR 0.71 0.82




| 7-City C.B.D. 26.11% | 16.39%
7-City Suburbs | 25.05% | 20.64%
4.28 Holding Period Returns for Boston's C.B.D.
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office N.O.I. for the period 1971 to 1986 had a high of
118.73%, and a low of -21.68%. Mean return for the
population was 23.71%, with a risk factor of 35.49%.
H.P.R. for the Boston suburban office N.O.I. had a high of
161.10%, and a low of -36.37% for the period 1976 to 1986.























STD. DEV. 35.49% 66.47%
COEF. VAR 1.50 2.11





| Boston C.B.D. | 31.21% | 38.57% ||BsoSbrs315%664---------------------
Boston Suburbs :31.53% :66.47%
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4.29 Comparisons between holding period return for the
seven city mean and Boston populations at both the C.B.D.
and suburban levels, for both periods (ie 1971 to 1986 and
1976 to 1986) were as follows: For the period 1971 to 1986,
the difference between H.P.R. on C.B.D. N.O.I. for both
populations had a high of 45.19%, a low of -40.69% with a
mean of -0.35%, and a standard deviation of 31.93%.
Suburban populations for the period 1976 to 1986 had the
following difference results: High 53.24%, low -105.94%,
mean of -6.48%, and a standard deviation of 59.13%.






















[N.B. 7-City Mean -Boston]
4.30 For the period 1976 to 1986 Boston C.B.D. H.P.R.
had a high of 118.73%, a low of -21.68% with an average
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Comparison of Holding Period Returns:
7-City Boston
Suburban Suburban
Year '76-'86 '76-'86 Difference
1976 2.97% -21.70% 24.67%
1977 32.31% 37.93% -5.62%
1978 53.03% 0.97% 52.06%
1979 -9.75% 18.18% -27.93%
1980 16.17% 122.11% -105.94%
1981 16.87% -36.37% 53.24%
1982 27.65% -8.89% 36.54%
1983 19.93% -11.68% 31.61%
1984 56.09% 161.10% -105.01%
1985 46.46% 101.11% -54.65%
1986 13.83% -15.96% 29.79%
Mean 25.05% 31.53% -6.48%
STD. DEV. 20.64% 66.47%
COEF. VAR 0.82 2.11
4.31 The valuation model combined aspects of the
N.O.I. and Boston office space data. The two sections of
the model, the urban and suburban test portfolio, and the
total office space population, both demonstrated greater
value for urban versus suburban office space. The test
period for these models was 1978 to 1986, based upon the
chronological limitations of the BOMA and Spaulding & Slye
data.
4.32 The test portfolio of C.B.D. office buildings had
an average value of $1,010,981,436 for the period examined,
and an average size of 8,293,553 sq ft, yielding an average
value per sq ft of $121.90. The portfolio had a growth rate
of 17.61% from 1978 to 1986. The test portfolio of suburban
office space buildings had an average value of
$346,745,383, an average size of 5,419,592 sq ft, and an
Page 73
average value per sq ft of $63.98. The growth rate for the
suburban portfolio was 11.78% for the period examined. The
average difference in values was $664,236,053, on 2,873,961
sq ft, averaging $57.92 per sq ft , and growing from 1978
to 1986 at 20.11% (See summary Tables on Next Page).
4.33 The results indicated a clear value predominance
for the C.B.D. portfolio. In all measures, whether absolute
or relative, C.B.D. office space displayed greater value,
size and growth. The value difference of $57.92 per sq ft
provided the key insight from this exercise. Though the
difference itself reflects only the buildings in the
portfolio, and should not be abstracted to all buildings in
the metropolitan area, it does characterize the situation
in general. On a per sq ft basis, suburban office space in
this portfolio maintains only 52% of the value of the
C.B.D. C.B.D.
Portfolio Portfolio Value
Year Rentable Area Values Per sq ft
1978 8,293,553 $610,569,924 $73.62
1979 8,293,553 $457,430,373 $55.15
1980 8,293,553 $488,950,069 $58.96
1981 8,293,553 $443,414,840 $53.47
1982 8,293,553 $440,062,788 $53.06
1983 8,293,553 $924,689,717 $111.50
1984 8,293,553 $1,495,267,935 $180.29
1985 8,293,553 $1,609,626,116 $194.08
1986 8,293,553 $2,628,821,158 $316.97
78-'86 Avg 8,293,553 1,010,981,436 $121.90




Year Rentable Area Values Per sq ft
1978 5,419,592 $220,733,833 $40.73
1979 5,419,592 $225,501,370 $41.61
1980 5,419,592 $412,867,590 $76.18
1981 5,419,592 $217,273,365 $40.09
1982 5,419,592 $198,414,296 $36.61
1983 5,419,592 $171,945,769 $31.73
1984 5,419,592 $365,281,920 $67.40
1985 5,419,592 $707,380,816 $130.52
1986 5,419,592 $601,309,485 $110.95
78-'86 Avg 5,419,592 346,745,383 $63.98
83-'86 Avg 5,419,592 461,479,498 $85.15
Difference Difference Difference
in Portfolio in Portfolio in Value
Year Rentable Area Values Per sq ft
1978 2,873,961 389,836,091 $32.89
1979 2,873,961 231,929,003 $13.55
1980 2,873,961 76,082,479 ($17.23)
1981 2,873,961 226,141,475 $13.37
1982 2,873,961 241,648,492 $16.45
1983 2,873,961 752,743,948 $79.77
1984 2,873,961 1,129,986,015 $112.89
1985 2,873,961 902,245,300 $63.56
1986 2,873,961 2,027,511,673 $206.02
78-'86 Avg 2,873,961 664,236,053 $57.92
83-'86 Avg 2,873,961 1,203,121,734 $115.56
C.B.D.. When the difference of total urban versus suburban
portfolios was considered, suburban worth fell to 34% of
the C.B.D. Yet annual average total suburban office space
in the portfolio occupied an area equivalent to 64% of that
of the C.B.D., indicating an inconsistency between value
and size. The suburban portfolio maintained a value
approximately one third of the C.B.D. group, but as
indicated above occupied two thirds of its size. This
indicates a disparity in values of approximately 50% (ie
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(1/3)/(2/3)) between the two portfolios.
4.34 As the analyses has demonstrated, C.B.D. versus
suburban value superiority is accelerated in the later
years of the study. For the period 1983 to 1986, the
average value of a C.B.D. portfolio square foot increased
$78.81 to $200.71 per sq ft, or 65%. The commensurate
suburban increase was $21.17 to $85.15, or 36.75% per sq
ft. The average total portfolio valuation difference
increased $538,885,681 to $1,203,121,734 per year, or 81%.
4.35 The valuation of total Boston office space, for
both the C.B.D. and the suburbs highlighted the theme of
C.B.D. value predominance. The average value of all Boston
C.B.D. office space was $3,089,841,294, which grew at an
annual rate of 19.5% for the years 1978 to 1986. The
average total rentable area for this population was
























































































The average total value for all
space was $1,054,473 671 with a
35.49%. The average total for
sq ft, which yielded a average
$77.65. Therefore, on a per sq
Boston area suburban office
commensurate growth rate of
rentable area was 13,579,507
value per square foot of
ft basis, C.B.D. office
space exceed the value of its suburban counterpart by
$67.48, or 87%. Average total population differences make
this trend even more apparent. The average annual
difference in value of the two populations over the period
Page 77
examined was $2,035,367,624, with a difference in total
rentable area of 7,710,659 yielding an average difference
in value per square foot of $263.97. This gap grew over the
course of the test period at a rate of 33.65%.
4.36 All trends and variances were again accelerated
in the latter years of the study period. C.B.D. average
value per square foot increased $64.82 to $209.95, or 45%.
Suburban average square foot values increased $14.01 to
$91.66 or 18%. C.B.D. values then exceeded the suburbs by
$118.29, up from $67.48, an increase of 75% from the years
1983 to 1986. All other pertinent trends such as growth
rate, total rentable area and the variances between the two
populations supported this trend.
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Section Five: Conclusion (5.1 to 5.7)
5.1 As a result of the literature surveyed, data
collected, and tests conducted on that data, it is the
conclusion of this study, that the assumption discussed
in paragraph 3.6 is proven true. Therefore, during the
years 1970 to 1986 for the C.B.D., and 1975 to 1986 for the
suburbs, the value of C.B.D. office space was greater than
of the suburbs both nationally and in the Boston
metropolitan area from the perspective of an investor.
5.2 The examination and testing of N.O.I. illustrated
a pattern of consistently higher C.B.D. values, which
conferred greater capitalized value to the C.B.D. The seven
city mean N.O.I. was consistently higher in the C.B.D.
both absolutely and in terms of growth (see 4.14 to 4.16)
than in the suburbs. The variance between increases in
rental rates and operating expenses also favored the C.B.D.
In the Boston C.B.D., N.O.I. was also absolutely and
relatively greater than in the suburbs, (see 4.17 to 4.19)
though not as consistently on an annual basis as the seven
city mean (58% of the time for Boston versus 80% for the
seven city mean). Seven city mean C.B.D. and suburban
N.O.I. consistently exceeded their Boston counterparts,
despite the fact that Boston had higher rents. This would
indicate that Boston buildings had higher operating ratios.
5.3 At the specifically Boston urban level, C.B.D.
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values were again shown to exceed the suburbs. Over the
1979 to 1988 period, C.B.D. rental rates were always
greater than the suburbs, by an average factor of 37% (see
4.21). Absorption for both populations was strong, and
displayed little quantitative variance (see 4.22), but
since rents were lower in the suburbs, and more space was
available (see 4.22), equivalent levels of absorption
indicate stronger C.B.D. values. Vacancy levels (see 4.23
to 4.25) for the entire period were lower in the C.B.D. by
an average of almost 7%, which again indicated a stronger
and more valuable C.B.D. office space market.
5.4 In both the N.O.I. and the specific urban Boston
studies, a trend of value acceleration was observed
beginning around 1982. In all cases, the bulk of total
growth observed over the period 1970 to 1986 for C.B.D.
values, or 1975 to 1986 for suburban values, was loaded
into those later years. Rates of growth acceleration
frequently exceeded 50%, and were especially strong in the
area of rental levels and absorption.
5.5 Holding Period Return data further confirmed
C.B.D. value predominance, in both the seven city mean and
Boston. In the seven city mean data, average returns on
C.B.D. N.O.I. exceeded the suburbs by 4%, and were 21%
less riskier (4.27). While in Boston, C.B.D. and suburban
average returns were equal, but returns were 72% more at
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risk in the suburbs (4.28). Boston C.B.D. returns averaged
more than 5% above the seven city mean, but were 37% more
at risk (4.30).
5.6 Portfolio and population valuation studies for
urban Boston further illustrated the trend of C.B.D. value
predominance and the rapid acceleration of that trend after
1982. C.B.D. portfolio value per square foot exceeded its
suburban counterpart by 90% for the period 1978 to 1986,
and by 135% for the period 1983 to 1986 (4.33). C.B.D.
population value per square foot was 87% for the period
1978 to 1986, and 117% for the period 1983 to 1986 (4.33).
5.7 The performance of C.B.D. N.O.I. was briefly
compared to other majors indicators. In all comparisons,
indexed changes in N.O.I. value were found to be much more
volitile than the smoother progressions of the the Consumer
Price Index, the Eastern Frank Russell index, and the AA
Composite Bond Rating. Indexed C.B.D. N.O.I. changes
displayed similarities with the G.N.P. measure of gross
private investment in non residential real estate. While
only intended as a minor area of investigation for this
study, these cursory findings indicated that C.B.D. N.O.I.
investments would be subject to much greater volitility,
return and risk than alternatives based upon the other
measurements.
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5.8 In summary, the results of the tests performed
indicated that C.B.D. office space values were
consistently greater and at lower risk than their suburban
counterparts, both across the seven city mean and in the
Boston urban area. Returns on Boston C.B.D. office space
were found to be greater than the seven city mean returns,
but substantially riskier. Finally, all trends accelerated
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Appendix 1 2:
Portfolio of Boston C.B.D. Office Buildings
Year Average Total SQ FT Occupancy
Building Nase/Address Complete Rent SQ FT Vacancy Rate
Prudential Tower 1965 25.00 1226539 5271 99.57%
State Street Bank Building 1966 30.00 854000 0 100.00%
One Center Plaza 1966 32.00 187276 0 100.00%
Two Center Plaza 1967 32.00 193082 11020 94.29%
Bank of New England Building 1968 28.00 580016 4965 99.14%
Three Center Palza 1969 32.00 195844 22000 88.77%
One Boston Place 1970 30.00 769000 0 100.00%
15 New Chardon Steet 1970 22.00 78745 56750 27.93%
Bank of Boston Building 1971 39.00 1355610 17975 98.67%
Keystone Building 1971 26.50 728000 9832 98.65%
101 Huntington Avenue 1971 26.00 432000 0 100.00%
One Washington Mall 1972 33.00 154406 0 100.00%
One Beacon Place 1973 30.50 1100000 3600 99.67%
One Bulfinch Place 1973 22.00 45000 0 100.00%
535 Boylston Street 1964 28.00 91000 24100 73.52%
70 Federal Street 1966 28.00 45000 31605 29.77%
100 Charles River Plaza 1968 22.00 118035 0 100.00%
25 New Chardon Street 1968 22.00 90000 0 100.00%
55 Court Street 1969 22.00 50000 0 100.00%
Portfolio of Boston Suburban Office Buildings
Year Average Total Occupancy
Address Complete Rent SQ FT Rate
1) Kendal Square/East Cambridge
545 Technology Square 1960 23.00 140000 100.00%
549 Technology Square 1965 23.00 36000 100.00%
565 Technology Square 1966 23.00 181000 100.00%
575 Technology Square 1963 23.00 111566 100.00%
2) Allston /Brighton
1505 Commonwealth Avenue- Brighton










131 Middlesex Turnpike- Burlington 1973 16.50 23000 85.07%
3 New England Executive Park- Burlington 1968 20.00 64569 63.23%
5 New England Executive Park- Burlington 1969 20.00 26506 100.00%
7 New England Executive Park- Burlington 1972 22.00 183500 100.00%
12 New England Executive Park- Burlington 1970 22.00 94860 100.00%
14 New England Executive Park- Burlington 1969 22.00 15000 100.00%
5 Old Concord Road- Burlington 1972 15.00 40000 100.00%
One Essex Center Drive- Peabody 1972 0.00 125000 100.00%
1 Newbury Street- Peabody 1973 15.00 38000 96.22%
80-88 Main Street- Reading 1967 12.50 17000 100.00%
100 Main Street- Reading 1967 14.00 18000 100.00%
4) Route 128 North
161 Forbes Road- Braintree 1964 15.00 34000 100.00%
166 Forbes Road- Braintree 1966 15.00 60000 100.00%
220 Forbes Road- Braintree 1968 15.00 56000 82.14%
22OR Forbes Road- Braintree 1968 15.00 22000 100.00%
222 Forbes Road- Braintree 1969 15.00 30000 100.00%
10 Forbes Road East- Braintree 1967 17.00 40000 78.31%
420 Washington Street- Braintree 1972 14.50 30000 84.98%
140 Wood Road- Braintree 1970 15.00 43000 100.00%
150 Wood Road- Braintree 1972 15.00 38000 81.58%
886 Washinbgton Street- Dedham 1966 15.50 31611 82.28%
888 Washington Street- Dedham 1966 15.50 31665 65.89%
1776 Heritage Drive- Quincy 1973 19.50 751878 100.00%
420 Providence Highway- Westwood 1971 18.00 40000 100.00%
5) Route 128 West
850 Boylston Street- Brookline 1971 18.50 120000 64.51%
111 Washington Street- Brookline 1971 24.50 140473 91.46%
29 Hartwell Avenue- Lexington 1969 20.00 56000 100.00%
4 Maguire Road- Lexington 1970 17.00 54114 100.00%
2 Militiea Drive- Lexington 1972 21.00 21000 88.49%
191 Spring Street- Lexington 1971 18.00 220000 75.00%
1050 Waltham Street- Lexington 1973 17.00 33000 81.67%
220 Boylston Street- Newton 1962 19.00 30000 100.00%
Gateway Center- Newton 1970 23.00 180000 88.89%
1 Wells Avenue- Newton 1971 18.00 88000 100.00%
110 Cedar Street- Wellesley 1968 20.00 30000 100.00%
40 Grove Street- Wellesley 1970 18.00 43700 95.89%
20 Walnut Street- Wellesley 1965 20.00 40000 86.21%
65 Walnut Street- Wellesley 1971 22.00 69725 100.00%
1 Washington Street- Wellesley 1966 20.00 48000 73.75%
36 Washington Street- Wellesley 1969 20.00 50000 89.17%
40 Washington Street- Wellesley 1969 19.00 24000 100.00%
20 William Street- Wellesley 1973 25.00 127000 94.29%
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40 William Street- Wellesley 1970 25.00 71904 93.32%
56 William Street- Wellesley 1968 25.00 52636 100.00%
60 William Street- Wellesley 1966 25.00 49826 100.00%
65 William Street- Wellesley 1963 25.00 29502 91.53%
165 Worcester Street- Wellesley 1973 18.00 21000 100.00%
173 Worcester Street- Wellesley 1973 17.50 31500 84.13%
888 Worcester Street- Wellesley 1973 20.00 54000 100.00%
9 Riverside Road- Weston 1970 23.00 63486 100.00%
235 Bear Hill Road- Waltham 1963 17.00 19480 86.28%
240 Bear Hill Road- Waltham 1963 16.00 16600 83.84%
303 Bear Hill Road- Waltham 1964 11.00 24000 26.04%
60 Hickory Drive- Waltham 1967 13.50 64000 100.00%
69 Hickory Drive- Waltham 1964 13.50 21600 80.39%
590 Lincoln Street- Waltham 1970 21.00 81312 100.00%
610 lincoln Street- Waltham 1971 21.00 81312 100.00%
214 Third Avenue- Waltham 1963 18.00 11000 72.73%
300 Third Avenue- Waltham 1966 18.00 21578 100.00%
391 Totten Pond Road- Waltham 1967 15.00 15000 92.33%
393 Totten Pond Road- Waltham 1966 15.00 15000 100.00%
395 Totten Pond Road- Waltham 1969 15.00 15000 100.00%
400 1 Totten Pond Road- Waltham 1970 16.00 80000 98.88%
400 2 Totten Pond Road- Waltham 1969 16.00 80000 95.29%
440 Totten Pond Road- Waltham 1969 15.00 15000 100.00%
460 Totten Pond Road- Waltham 1971 16.00 140000 92.61%
470 Totten Pond Road- Waltham 1970 21.00 66500 95.25%
486 Totten Pond Road- Waltham 1969 21.00 31253 29.61%
504 Totten Pond Road- Waltham 1968 21.00 28604 84.62%
225 Wyman Street- Waltham 1954 21.00 143942 100.00%
235 Wyman Street- Waltham 1968 23.00 97919 100.00%
275 Wyman Street- Waltham 1963 22.00 81663 98.16%
260 Cochituate Road- Framingham 1967 17.50 23088 90.05%
160 Speen Street- Framingham 1972 18.00 16000 91.88%
1661 Worcester Road- Framingham 1973 16.00 50000 94.25%
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Appendix 1 3:








































































































































































































































American Council of Life Insurance Annual Capitalization Rates
For the years 1970 to 1987.
New National National
England Office Bldg. Cap Rate
Office Bldg. Cap Rate All
Summary: Cap Rate Average Properties
1970 Year Total 10.80% 10.75% 11.18%
1971 Year Total 9.70% 9.80% 10.49%
1972 Year Total 9.33% 9.40% 10.06%
1973 Year Total 9.23% 9.33% 9.75%
1974 Year Total 10.08% 9.95% 10.15%
1975 Year Total 10.43% 10.53% 10.85%
1976 Year Total 10.05% 10.25% 10.33%
1977 Year Total 9.83% 9.80% 9.98%
1978 Year Total 10.05% 9.85% 10.00%
1979 Year Total 10.63% 10.35% 10.48%
1980 Year Total 11.95% 12.00% 12.18%
1981 Year Total 13.38% 13.03% 13.08%
1982 Year Total 13.10% 12.33% 12.33%
1983 Year Total 12.18% 11.00% 11.08%
1984 Year Total 11.00% 10.73% 10.83%
1985 Year Total 7.93% 10.03% 10.10%
1986 Year Total 9.13% 9.18% 9.25%
1987 Year Total 9.45% 9.20% 9.23%
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